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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
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defendant claimed It was entitled, and thereafter defendant 
failed to so advise plaintiff. 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in deny-
ing plaintiff's motion for an order granting it leave to file 
an amended complaint to conform to the evidence and to assert a 
cause of action for reformation of the typewritten agreement, 
where the defendant had previously admitted that the rate 
structure alleged by plaintiff was accurate and that there was 
no real dispute as to the amount of the debt, if any, but 
thereafter nevertheless raised a dispute concerning both the 
rate structure and the amount of the debt on the second day of 
trial? 
4. Did the trial court err in failing (a) to find 
that a mutual mistake between the parties had occurred because 
the rate structure contained in the typewritten agreement did 
not accurately embody the intentions of both parties to the 
contract and (b) to reform the contract to accurately reflect 
the parties1 true understanding? 
5. Did the trial court err in finding the hand-
written agreement executed by the parties contained a com-
mission rate structure at the rate of .35$ rather than the rate 
of 350? 
6. Did the trial court err in failing to award plain-
tiff its costs of depositions and service of subpoena on defen-
dant's president for his deposition when said depositions were 
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taken in good faith and the costs thereof necessarily incurred 
for the preparation of plaintiff's case and the subpoena was 
reasonably considered by plaintiff to be necessary in light of 
defendant's prior failures to cooperate in providing discovery 
absent a court order. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an action based upon breach of contract for 
recovery of commissions due plaintiff Lloyd's Unlimited 
("Lloyd's") by defendant Nature's Way Marketing Ltd. ("Nature's 
Way") for all product sold by defendant to a third party, 
Yurika Foods Corporation ("Yurika"), in consideration of 
Lloyd's efforts in inducing Yurika to market the product 
handled by Nature's Way. In connection therewith, Lloyd's 
sought a formal accounting from Nature's Way with respect to 
the products sold to Yurika by Nature's Way by which the amount 
of the commission owed to Lloyd's could be ascertained. 
Defendant Nature's Way counterclaimed against Lloyd's for the 
sum of $7,500.00 arguing that Lloyd's agreed to pay to Nature's 
Way one-half of any commissions or payments Lloyd's received 
from Yurika. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Court. 
Plaintiff filed its Complaint against Defendant on 
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August 19, 1983. (R. 2-4A) Defendant was served on September 
17, 1983 with the Summons and Complaint. (R. 5-7) 
Soon after the Complaint was served upon Nature's Way, 
plaintiff's counsel was contacted by Bert R. Wonnacott, 
Esquire, to discuss the possibility of resolving the matter. 
Subsequently, plaintiff's counsel was contacted by Kay M. 
Lewis ("Lewis"), to discuss the possibility of settlement. In 
early November, 1983, Lloyd's counsel prepared a First Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents and 
served the same upon Lewis in an effort to obtain some sort of 
reasonable accounting from Nature's Way so that Lloyd's could 
adequately discuss and explore the possibility of settlement. 
(R. 53-61 and 8~16|) 
Despite Lewis' efforts, Nature's Way failed and 
refused to submit any answers to the interrogatories or respond 
to the request for production of documents and Lloyd's was 
forced to file a motion to compel discovery and for appropriate 
sanctions with an accompanying memorandum on April 2, 1984. 
(R. 17-23) On April 9, 1984, Lloyd's counsel set the motion to 
compel and for sanctions for hearing before the lower court on 
April 24, 1984. (R. 24-25) Thereafter, Lewis withdrew as 
counsel for defendant on April 12, 1984 prior to the date of 
the hearing. (R. 26) 
Because of Lewis' withdrawal prior to the hearing, 
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plaintiff moved for and obtained an order on April 18, 1984, 
directing Nature's Way to appoint new counsel to represent it 
in the action prior to the hearing on Lloyd's motion to compel 
discovery and for sanctions. This order was mailed directly to 
defendant and its prior counsel, (R. 27-29) 
Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery and for 
sanctions came for hearing before the trial court as scheduled 
on April 24, 1984, and defendant failed to appear. In connec-
tion with the hearing, the Court entered an order on May 22, 
1984, compelling defendant to fully respond to the interroga-
tories and requests for production on or before June 1, 1984 
and awarding Lloyd's the sum of $150.00 as and for attorney's 
fees. (R. 35-37) In addition to its being mailed to defen-
dant's prior counsel, the Order Compelling Discovery and 
Awarding Attorney's Fees was personally served upon defendant. 
(R. 48-51) 
On June 1, 1984, present counsel for Nature's Way 
entered an appearance on its behalf. (R. 38) In connection with 
counsel's appearance for Nature's Way, they sought and obtained 
an ex parte order extending the time in which Nature's Way 
could respond to discovery to and including June 15, 1984. (R. 
45-47) 
Nature's Way answered Lloyd's Complaint and 
counterclaimed against Lloyd's on October 12, 1984. (R. 
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71-77). 
On January 7, 1985, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Par-
tial Summary Judgment together with an accompanying memorandum 
and affidavit seeking partial summary judgment for certain com-
missions due Lloyd's on sales made by Nature's Way to Yurika 
during the period from August 1, 1982 through February 23, 
1984. The amount sought by plaintiff was the sum of 
$31,545.64, which sum included interest on the commissions as 
of December 1, 1984. (R. 105-129) Plaintiff's Motion for Par-
tial Summary Judgment was heard before the lower court on 
January 22, 1985. On that date, the Court found that there was 
some ambiguity in the agreement upon which this action is based 
and denied the motion, (R. 142-144) An order reflecting the 
Court's denial of the partial summary judgment was entered by 
the Court on January 31, 1985. (R. 170-172) 
Thereafter, the case came on for trial before the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder, sitting without a jury, on February 
25 and 26, 1985. After both sides rested, the Court took the 
matter under advisement and directed counsel to submit post-
trial memoranda. (R. 177-178) 
After the trial hereof and prior to the Court's ruling 
thereon, plaintiff moved the Court on March 8, 1985 for an 
order allowing it leave to file an amended complaint seeking 
reformation of the commission rates schedule contained in the 
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issues under advisement and treated the parties1 argument on 
the memorandum decision as a motion by the plaintiff to adjust 
its March 19, 1985 decision, which motion was denied by the 
Court on April 8, 1985. (R. 307-308) 
On May 2, 1985, plaintiff submitted directly to the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder, its proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Memorandum of Costs and 
Disbursements, Order Denying Leave to File Amended Complaint 
and Order Striking Affidavit of Lynn Burningham. (R. 371-373, 
337-3^0) Several of these pleadings were misplaced by the 
Court. Nature's Way did not file any objection to the two pro-
posed orders, but objected to Plaintiff's proposed findings and 
conclusions and memorandum of costs. Accordingly, on May 6 and 
7, 1985, defendant submitted its own proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law to the Court, together with its Motion 
to Have the Bill of Costs Taxed by the Court. (R. 317-328) 
These two documents were also misplaced by the Court. 
Thereafter, a hearing was scheduled and held before the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder on June 11, 1985, for the deter-
mination by the Court of the issues between the parties as to 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law and the amount of 
costs to be awarded plaintiff. 
At the hearing, counsel for plaintiff and defendant 
were informed that the Court had misplaced the pleadings 
-8-
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Nature1s Way *s president, Lynn Burn Ingram ("Burningham" • are 
both experienced salesmen who spent a substantial portion of 
their working lives in the selling profession. (Tr. 406-408; 
477-478) Dowdle and Burningham have been acquainted with and 
had an ongoing informal personal relationship since the early 
1950fs. (Tr. 408^409; 478-479) 
In late 1981 and early 1982, Dowdle and Burningham 
were in frequent contact with each other and became generally 
aware of the products and sales activity each was then 
involved. (Id.) During the early part of 1982, Dowdle learned 
that Burningham had acquired the rights to market and was 
attempting to market a coffee extender product. (Tr. 409-411) 
Shortly after learning of the product, Dowdle became acquainted 
with Douglas Webb ("Webb") and learned that he and a number of 
other persons who were experienced in the sales field were in 
the process of starting a sales organization that would be 
involved in the multi-level marketing and sales on a national 
basis of various food products. (Tr. 411, 413-416) After 
meeting Webb and learning of the sales and marketing organiza-
tion he and his associates were organizing, which company sub-
sequently became Yurika Foods Corporation, Dowdle commenced 
discussions with Burningham concerning the possibility of 
having Yurika market and sell the coffee extender product. 
(Tr. 416-418) 
Dowdle informed Burningham of the developing sales 
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During t h e nex t s e v e r a l mon ths , t h e p a r t i e s c o n -
t i n u e d t h e i v 1: *ouss i oris in an -fYor1 t ^ d joe t n e i r o r - . 
L j> :- < - ^ n 
August owdia and ^urningham net t discuss Vie exe-
cution of a written memorandum OL tncir agreement, jn ~nat 
date, Burningham informed Dowdle that because of the packaging 
and production costs, Nature's Way would be unable to pay $1.00 
per pound to Lloyd's for the product it sold to Yurika. (Tr. 
425-426) On that date, the parties executed a handwritten 
document prepared by Dowdle (Ex 2; Tr. 424-426, 490-493), which 
the District Court found provided the following rate structure 
for commissions to be paid by Nature's Way to Lloyd's : 
1 unit - 60 packets pack: .250 
1 unit - 2 lb. bulk pack: .350 
1 unit - 5 lb. bulk pack: 500 
1 unit - 37 lb. bulk pack: $1.00 
(R. 329-336) 
Lloyd's claims that the 2 lb. bulk pack commission 
rate on the handwritten agreement is 350 and not .350 and that 
the lower court erred in its interpretation of this oortion of 
the commission schedule. (Ex. 2) 
Dowdle also testified that he made a mistake in 
writing the rate structure in the handwritten agreement and 
that the parties intended that the rates to be paid were as 
follows: 
1 unit - 60 packets pack: $ .25 
1 unit - 2 lb. bulk pack: .35 
1 unit - 5 lb. bulk pack: .50 
1 unit - 37 lb. bulk pack: 1.00 
(Tr. 633-634) 
Shortly thereafter, the handwritten agreement was 
reproduced in typewritten form. (Tr. 427-428, 493-494) The 
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to contact Nature's Way after that date to discuss the amounts 
due Lloyd's, but its efforts were unsuccessful. These efforts 
included several telephone calls, a personal letter, and a 
letter from Lloyd's accountant, Spencer Neilsen. (Exhibits 12, 
14, Tr. 431-440, 501-506) 
Because Lloyd's failed to receive any further 
payment from Nature's Way or any accounting as to sales made, 
plaintiff initiated the present action. Plaintiff alleged in 
its Complaint (R. 3), asserted in its Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and affidavit and memorandum in support 
thereof dated January 4, 1985 (R. 105-129), and claimed at all 
times herein and during the trial hereof, that Nature's Way was 
obligated to pay Lloyd's commissions based upon the following 
rate schedule: 
1 unit - 60 packets pack: $ .25 
1 unit - 2 lb. bulk pack: .35 
1 unit - 5 lb. bulk pack: .50 
1 unit - 37 lb. bulk pack: 1.00 
Nature's Way denied liability for any commissions, alleging 
that there was no consideration for the Agreement between the 
parties and that Lloyd's had failed to perform certain obliga-
tions not contained within the written agreement. (R. 71-77, 
130-139, 151-169) 
Until the second day of the trial, Nature's Way 
admitted at all times that the rate structure identified above 
advocated by Lloyd's ("Subject Rate Schedule") applied to any 
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states: 
Defendant has no objection to what plaintiff 
has set out as uncontested facts other than 
that important uncontested facts were 
omitted. 
(R. 130) 
The facts which Nature's Way disputes in its response 
to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment have nothing 
to do with the rate schedule alleged by plaintiff that formed 
the basis of the parties' agreement. (R. 130-132) The entire 
focus of defendant's objection to the Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment was that the Agreement was unenforceable 
because of a failure of consideration. (R. 130-139; 151-154) 
The amount prayed for in Lloyd's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment was based upon calculations made by Thomas V. 
Chamberlain, C.P.A., based upon the per unit rates contained in 
the Subject Rate Schedule. In connection with its Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, Lloyd's filed an affidavit of 
Chamberlain dated December 20, 1984, containing two exhibits 
setting forth a summary of computations of commissions due 
plaintiff during that period based upon the Subject Rate 
Schedule. At the hearing on said motion on January 22, 1985, 
which was attended by Burningham, Nature's Way stipulated that 
the amounts computed by Chamberlain based upon the commission 
schedule asserted by Lloyd's were true and correct and agreed 
that the only determination that the Court needed to make at 
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This order entitled Order Governing Discovery was served upon 
counsel for Nature's Way on or about January 29, 1985 and no 
objection was filed thereto. (R. 173-175) 
For some unknown reason, the Order Governing Discovery 
was never executed by the Court although the parties complied 
with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Order and 
Nature's Way failed to advise plaintiff prior to the trial of 
any adjustments to which it claims it was entitled. 
(R. 145-149 and Appendix "B") 
Nature's Way also stipulated at-trial that if the 
agreement was enforceable that the amounts alleged by plaintiff 
pursuant to the Subject Rate Schedule were accurate. (Tr. 404, 
412-413, 430, 459-461) 
On the second day of trial, Nature's Way claimed for 
the first time that the commissions should be based specifi-
cally upon the typewritten agreement and not upon the Subject 
Rate Schedule. (Tr. 577-579) Shortly after the trial thereof 
and before any ruling the Court, plaintiff sought leave to file 
an Amended Complaint to conform to the prior stipulations and 
record and evidence at trial and to seek reformation of the 
typewritten agreement based upon a scrivener's error and mutual 
mistake, which motion was denied by the Court. (R. 180-181, 
218-222, 337-338, 341-342, Appendix "D") 
After receiving post-trial memoranda from both par-
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ties, (R. 190-199, 200-217, 230-246, 252-258, 259-264, 268-270) 
the lower court ruled that Lloyd's was entitled to a commission 
on the products sold by Nature's Way to Yurika, but awarded its 
commissions based strictly upon the rate structure set forth in 
the typewritten agreement in the total amount of $416.25, 
together with costs in the amount of $138.77. (R. 271, 
368-370) Plaintiff sought additional costs from Nature's Way 
which were not awarded by the lower court. (R. 371-373, 
325-328, 309-313, Tr. 649-666) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the 
Court below, the trial court's findings of fact are not suf-
ficiently supported by the evidence. In this regard, the trial 
court specifically found the intent of the parties did not 
change from the dates of execution of the handwritten agreement 
and the typewritten agreement, although the terms thereof are 
materially different, and there were undisputed evidence and 
stipulations prior to and during the trial that both parties 
intended that the commissions be paid, if at all, according to 
the rate structure alleged by plaintiff. 
The defendant should have been estopped from asserting 
and the trial court erred in considering and/or admitting evi-
dence that the applicable rate structure was other than that 
alleged by plaintiff because the defendant had admitted (1) in 
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its Answer, (2) in its response to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, (3) at the hearing at the Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Pre-Trial Settlement Conference, 
and (4) at the first day of trial, that there was no dispute 
concerning the rate structure as alleged by plaintiff. 
Additionally, the trial court had previously ordered at the 
pre-trial settlement conference that the amounts prayed for by 
plaintiff would be deemed accurate unless defendant advised 
plaintiff prior to the trial with respect to any offsets or 
adjustments to which it was entitled, and the defendant failed 
to so advise plaintiff. 
The trial court abused its discretion in not allowing 
plaintiff to file an amended complaint to conform to the evi-
dence and to assert a cause of action for reformation of the 
typewritten agreement. In this regard, the defendant nad pre-
viously admitted on several occasions that the rate structure 
alleged by plaintiff was accurate and that there was no real 
dispute as to the amount of the debt, if any, but thereafter 
nevertheless raised the dispute concerning both the rate struc-
ture and the amount of the debt on the second day of trial. 
The trial court erred in failing to find that a mutual 
mistake between the parties had occurred because the rate 
structure contained in the typewritten agreement did not 
accurately embody the intentions of both parties to the 
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contract and in failing to reform the contract to accurately 
reflect the parties' true understanding• 
The trial court erred in finding that the handwritten 
agreement executed by the parties contained a commission rate 
structure at the rate of .350 rather than the rate of 350 as 
the review of the handwritten agreement readily discloses. 
The trial court erred in failing to award plaintiff 
its costs of deposition and service of subpoena on defendant's 
president for his deposition when the depositions were taken in 
good faith and the costs thereof necessarily incurred in the 
preparation of plaintiff's case. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE NOT 
SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
AND ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THEMSELVES 
AND WITH THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Lloyd's recognizes that to mount a successful attack 
on the trial court's findings of fact that it must marshall all 
of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and 
then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support 
the findings even in the light most favorable to the court 
below. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
Lloyd's submits that even in the view most favorable to the 
court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial 
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court's findings. The findings of the trial court should be 
disturbed in this case because they are clearly against the 
weight of the evidence. See Janke v. Beckstead, 8 Utah 2d 247, 
332 P.2d 933, 935 (1958). 
Paragraphs 3 through 6 of the Findings of Fact entered 
by the Court are inaccurate, inconsistent, and clearly against 
the weight of the evidence. Dowdle testified that the original 
oral agreement between the parties provided for commissions to 
be paid at the rate of $1.00 per pound. Although Burningham 
initially denied this fact (Tr. 481-482), he admitted the 
existence of this arrangement on cross-examination. (R. 593) 
This finding is also supported by the handwritten agreement 
(Ex. 2) and the fact that Nature's Way paid the sum of $500.00 
to Lloyd's for sales to Yurika of the coffee extender product 
over the initial approximate three-month period. This amount 
was paid without any formal accounting and at a time in which 
sales by Nature's Way to Yurika of the product were just 
beginning. The trial court also found that the parties had 
reached an oral understanding prior to execution of the 
handwritten agreement. (Tr. 643) 
The clear and convincing weight of the evidence, 
however, does not support the Court's findings with respect to 
the handwritten agreement. A review of the commission rate 
structure of Exhibit 2, the handwritten agreement, clearly 
-22-
indicates that the only unit of sale in which Dowdle placed a 
decimal point before the number is .250 for the 60 packets 
pack. The other categories of the commission rate schedule 
read 350, 500 and $1.00. 
Any reasonable and legal interpretation of the com-
mission schedule and the testimony at the trial hereof is that 
both parties agreed upon commissions at the rate of 250, 350, 
500 and $1.00, depending upon the rate and size of the quan-
tities sold by Nature's Way to Yurika. Dowdle testified that 
that was the express understanding of the parties and there was 
evidence before the Court that he normally wrote 250 as .250, 
not recognizing there was any difference. (R. 296-306) 
Burningham testified that he did not specifically remember the 
rate structure agreed upon by the parties, but that he felt 
bound by the typewritten contract. (Tr. 584-490) His testi-
mony at the second day of trial, is completely inconsistent 
with every position Nature's Way had taken prior to that date. 
As has been previously mentioned, Nature's Way admitted that 
the parties' intent was the rate structure alleged by and 
testified to by Lloyd's at every other stage of this pro-
ceeding, including in its Answer, in its response to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, at the hearing 
on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, in the 
deposition of Burningham, and on the first day of trial. 
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Moreover, Findings of Fact numbers 4 through 6 are 
inherently inconsistent and establish clear grounds for plain-
tiff's claim for reformation of the commission rate schedule 
contained in the typewritten agreement. This Court has longed 
recognized that: 
The importance of complete, accurate and 
consistent findings of fact in a case 
tried by a judge is essential to the resolu-
tion of dispute under the proper rule of 
law. 
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). 
This principle was cited in Parks v. Zionys First 
National Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983) where the Court 
held that the Court's findings must resolve all issues of 
material fact necessary to justify the conclusions of law and 
judgment and that failure of the Court to enter adequate fin-
dings requires the judgment to be vacated. 
By finding that the rate structures in the handwritten 
agreement and typewritten agreement were materially different 
and subsequently finding that the intent of the parties did not 
change between the dates of execution of the two agreements, 
the Court found in substance that there had been a mutual 
mistake of the parties to the agreement, but refused to allow 
the filing of an amended complaint by Lloyd's to reform the 
contract to reflect the parties' true understanding. 4 true 
and accurate copy of the proposed amended complaint attached as 
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an exhibit to Plaintiff's Motion for Order Granting Leave to 
File Amended Complaint, not an initial part of the record 
herein, is attached hereto as Appendix ffD.!l 
The findings and judgment of the trial court are 
clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence. 4s previously 
stated, the $500.00 check delivered by Nature's Way to Lloyd's 
on August 16, 1982, reflected and evidenced the parties' 
understanding that the commissions agreed upon were 250, 350, 
and 500 per respective unit and not .250, .350, and .500 per 
unit. Furthermore, it is inconceivable and contrary to the 
weight of all of the evidence that the parties' agreement was 
based upon the express rate schedule of the typewritten 
agreement which, if applied, would yield commissions to Lloyd's 
in the principal amount of approximately $300.00 on more than 
$625,000.00 worth of sales by Nature's Way to Yurika during the 
two years subsequent to the date of the typewritten agreement. 
The fact that the parties intended their rate com-
mission schedule to be that as alleged by plaintiff is also 
clearly shown by the fact that the parties would obviously not 
have agreed or intended to pay only a fraction of a cent (.25<2) 
on some units and 500 and $1.00 on other per unit sales of the 
same product involving only slight differences in weight and 
volume. The only scintilla of evidence supporting a finding 
that the parties intended the commission rate structures to be 
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a fraction of one penney is the evasive testimony of Burningham 
on the trial's second day in which he states he does not 
remember the actual rate structure agreed upon but feels bound 
by the typed agreement. All other evidence, including the 
deposition testimony of Burningham on September 5, 1984, the 
summary judgment hearing, the trial and hearing stipulations, 
order of the trial court, and language of the contracts, 
clearly support the rate structure as alleged by plaintiff. 
Point II 
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING 
AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING 
AND ADMITTING EVIDENCE THAT THE APPLICABLE 
RATE STRUCTURE GOVERNING THE PARTIES' AGREE-
MENT WAS OTHER THAN THAT ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF. 
The test of equitable estoppel is set forth in Koch, 
Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., 534 P.2d 903, 905 (Utah 1975): 
[Equitable stoppel] is conduct, by act or 
omission^by which one party knowingly leads 
another party, reasonably acting thereon, 
to take some course of action, which will re-
sult in his detriment or damage if the first 
party is permitted to repudiate or deny his 
conduct or representation. 
This test was cited with approval in Parks v. Zion's First 
National Bank, 590 P.2d at 604. 
In the present action, the actions of Nature's Way 
satisfy the test of equitable estoppel. As previously 
explained, Nature's Way, on numerous occasions throughout this 
proceeding, agreed that if the agreement between the parties 
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was enforceable, the commissions should be payable to Lloyd's 
according to the Subject Rate Schedule. This fact was admitted 
in defendant's Answer, in its response to Plaintiff's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, at the hearing on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Pre-Trial Conference, 
in Burningham's deposition in September, 1984, and at the first 
day of the trial hereof. In this regard, the trial court ruled 
at the Pre-Trial Settlement Conference and Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment hearing that the amounts prayed for by Lloyd's 
would be deemed accurate unless Nature's Way advised Lloyd's 
prior to the trial of any offsets or adjustments to which 
Nature's Way claimed it was entitled. (R. 173-175) This 
ruling is consistent with the stipulation of the parties at the 
hearing and Rule 2(g) and (h), Rules of Practice of the Third 
Judicial District Court. (Appendix "E") At no time did 
Nature's Way advise Lloyd's of the discrepancy in the com-
mission rate schedule. Lloyd's clearly relied upon the various 
representations and stipulations of Nature's Way to its detri-
ment and as such Nature's Way is estopped from asserting a new 
claim for the first time on the second day of trial. Under the 
circumstances, the trial court should not have considered evi-
dence that the applicable rate structure was other than that as 
alleged by Lloyd's. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING LLOYD'S LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED 
COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE AND 
TO ASSERT A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR REFORMATION 
OF THE TYPEWRITTEN AGREEMENT• 
As previously mentioned, the clear weight of the evi-
dence and testimony before the Court entitles Lloyd's to reform 
the typewritten agreement to conform to the evidence. 
Plaintiff should be granted leave to file an amended 
complaint herein to conform to the evidence adduced at the 
trial hereof. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) provides in part: 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings 
as may be necessary to cause them to conform 
to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time, even after judgment . . . . 
It is axiomatic that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
should be liberally construed and applied so as to promote 
justice. Rule 1 provides that the rules "shall be liberally 
construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action." This fundamental philosophy of 
liberality which supports the rules is manifest in a number of 
specific provisions including Rule 15(a) which specifically 
provides that leave to amend shall be "freely" granted when 
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"justice so requires." This principle is also set forth in 
Rule 54(c)(1), which provides for a kind of post-trial amend-
ment by virtue of its requirement that "every final judgment 
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is 
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such 
relief in his pleadings." (Emphasis added.) 
The philosophy that each case should be decided "on 
its facts rather than on its pleadings," Keller v. Gerber, 114 
Utah 345, 199 P.2d 562, 565 (1948), is so fundamental under 
Utah law that amendments to pleadings have been allowed and 
approved even after the trial court has filed its initial 
memorandum decision. See Watson v. Deseret Irrigation Co., 110 
Utah 78, 69 P.2d 793 (1946). 
As previously stated, defendant failed to raise any 
issue as to the amounts payable under the rate schedule of the 
contract until the second day of trail. Prior to that time, 
defendant and his counsel on numerous occasions before this 
Court and during the course of Lynn Burninghamfs deposition, 
stipulated and agreed that the commissions payable under the 
Agreement, should it be determined to be valid, were to be 
based upon 250, 350 and 50<£ and not .250, .350 and .500. This 
fact is more particularly set forth in other areas of the argu-
ment herein and by this reference made a part hereof. The 
testimony offered at trial and stipulations made prior to and 
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thereat, clearly support the relief for which plaintiff sought, 
leave to amend its complaint for reformation of the subject 
agreement. 
Point IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING (A) TO 
FIND A MUTUAL MISTAKE BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
HAD OCCURRED AND (B) TO REFORM THE CONTRACT 
TO ACCURATELY REFLECT THE PARTIES' TRUE 
UNDERSTANDING. 
This Court has long recognized that reformation of a 
written instrument is appropriate if: 
(1) ,the instrument as written fails to conform to 
what both parties intended; or 
(2) that the claiming party was mistaken as to 
its actual content and the other party knowing this 
mistake kept silent; or 
(3) that the claiming party was mistaken as to 
the actual content because of fraudulent, affirmative 
behavior .i 
Jensen v. Manila Corp, of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 565 P.2d 63, 65 (Utah 1977), citing 6 Powell on 
Real Property § 903 (1977) 
Lloyd's recognizes that to reform a written instrument 
it must show a mutual mistake of the parties or a mistake on 
the part of one and fraud or inequitable conduct such as 
silence on the part of the other, as a result of which the 
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instrument reflects something neither party had intended or 
agreed to. Bown v. Loveland, 670 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah 1984). 
Lloyd's also recognizes that the mistake must be presented by 
clear and convincing evidence. Id. In Bown, this Court 
vacated the lower court's reformation primarily because the 
issue of mutual mistake was not raised in the context of the 
trial and the evidence failed to sustain that position. 
The same test for reformation were recently cited by 
this Court in Briggs v. Liddell, 669 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985). 
In that case, this Court discussed the two general reasons that 
a contract may be reformed: 
First, if the instrument does not embody the 
intentions of both parties to the contract, 
a mutual mistake has occurred, and refor-
mation is appropriate. Second, if one party 
is laboring under a mistake about a contract 
term and that mistake either has been 
induced by the other party or is known by and 
conceded to by the other party, then the 
inequitable nature of the other party's con-
duct will have the same operable effect as a 
mistake, and reformation is permissible. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) 
Lloyd's maintains that the commission rate of the 
contract should have been reformed under both reasons. First, 
there is compelling evidence that the instrument does not 
embody the intentions of both parties to the contract and that 
a mutual mistake has occurred. All pleadings, stipulations, 
testimony of the parties and the differences between the 
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handwritten and typewritten agreements compel the conclusion 
that the commission schedule agreed upon by the party was as 
plaintiff alleged and not as contained in the typewritten 
agreement. The only evidence contrary to this fact is the 
testimony of Burningham on the trial's second day in which 
Burningham believes that the commissions as agreed upon by the 
parties were whatever was specified in the typewritten 
contract. 
In any event, the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
satisfies the second theory of reformation. As noted in 
Briggs, supra, if one party (Lloyd's) is laboring under a 
mistake about a contract term and the mistake is known by or 
conceded to by the other party (Nature's Way), then the ine-
quitable nature of Nature's Way's actions has the same operable 
effect as a mistake. 659 P.2d at 772. In this regard, it is 
clear that Lloyd's was laboring under a mistake about the com-
mission rate schedule. Dowdle testified that any ambiguity or 
error was a result of his mistaken belief that the handwritten 
and typewritten agreements accurately reflected the parties' 
intent and understanding that the per unit rates were 250, 350, 
500 and $1.00. (Tr. 633-634 and R. 293-306) 
Assuming, arguendo, that Burningham did not have the 
same mistaken belief as Dowdle, the inequitable nature of his 
conduct in knowing and conceding to the commission schedule 
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alleged by plaintiff must by law have the same operative effect 
as a mistake. This fact is readily apparent from the deposi-
tion testimony, summary judgment and pre-trial conference 
hearing, trial stipulations, Order Governing Discovery, and 
testimony of Burningham at the trial hereof, all of which were 
relied upon by Dowdle. 
The equitable doctrine of reformation applies where 
there is no mistake about the terms of the agreement and the 
only mistake is in connection with reducing the parties' 
agreement to writing as is the case in the present action. 
Other jurisdictions have recognized that reformation is most 
appropriate in the circumstances. A scrivener's inadvertent 
error, or an error on the part of either party, no matter how 
it occurred, may be corrected. Baby Togs, Inc. v. Harold 
Trimming Co., 67 A.D. 2d 868, 413 N.Y.2d 393, 394 (1979). 
In the case of Simons v. Federal Bar Building Corp., 
275 A.2d 545 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971), a written lease was executed 
by the parties in which the scrivener committed a similar error 
to that committed by Dowdle in the present action. In that 
case, the figure of .015 was erroneously inserted in a contract 
whereas the correct figure should have been 1.5. In holding 
that the parties should not be bound by the strict operation of 
the contract the Court stated: 
We believe this situation is governed by the 
myriad of cases granting the relief for an 
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obvious mistake in transposing the agreement 
to writing. 
275 A.2d at 551. 
In that case, the D.C. Court of Appeals pointed out 
that reformation has often been granted where the mistake has 
been denominated "unilateral" and in cases where the courts 
hold that the contract lacks mutuality even though the error 
resulted from the miscalculation of only one party as was the 
case in this action. Lloyd's urges this Court to consider the 
weight of the evidence to serve the purpose of the agreement as 
was noted by the Simons court: 
Fairness will best be served by weighing the 
circumstances surrounding the mistake rather 
than the application of mechanical rules 
which ignore the real nature of the 
situation. 
275 A.2d at 551. 
The fact that Dowdle prepared the handwritten and 
typewritten agreements and made the mistake in their prepara-
tion should not bar Lloyd's from seeking or from obtaining the 
reformation which it seeks. This fact was noted in People v. 
South East National Bank of Chicago, 266 N.E.2d 778, 781 (111. 
App. Ct. 1971): 
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that 
not all negligence will be a bar to 
rescission. If the mistake is natural in 
the conduct of business, or is not the 
result of culpable negligence or the neglect 
of some positive legal duty, rescission will 
be granted. Where the mistake is due to 
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clerical or arithmetic error the courts are 
nearly unanimous in granting rescission or 
other appropriate relief. 
(Emphasis added)(citations omitted.) 
In People, a subcontrator was relieved of his bid 
because a decimal point was inadvertently misplaced by its 
secretary. In noting that this mistake was not due to the lack 
of ordinary care and that the contractor should be given the 
relief from the agreement as written, the Court stated: 
To penalize Kelleher [subcontractor] for the 
simple, honest mistake by enforcing the for-
feiture provision of the contract would be 
unjust. 
Where the conditions requisite to relief 
are present, equity will act in spite of a 
contract to avoid the unconscionable result. 
(Citations omitted.) 
In that case, the Court noted that the standards 
governing rescission were identical to that which has been 
adopted in Utah, but held that when the mistake was due to a 
clerical error, such as a misplaced decimal point as in the 
present case, the party making the error was entitled to 
appropriate relief. 
This court has recognized the equitable standards set 
forth in People, and Simons, supra. In Hottinger v. Jensen, 
684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984), this Court held that refor-
mation is appropriate where the terms of the written instrument 
are mistaken in that they do not show the true intent and 
-35-
clerical or arithmetic error the courts are 
nearly unanimous in granting rescission or 
other appropriate relief, 
(Emphasis added)(citations omitted.) 
In People, a subcontrator was relieved of his bid 
because a decimal point was inadvertently misplaced by its 
secretary. In noting that this mistake was not due to the lack 
of ordinary care and that the contractor should be given the 
relief from the agreement as written, the Court stated: 
To penalize Kelleher [subcontractor] for the 
simple, honest mistake by enforcing the for-
feiture provision of the contract would be 
unjust. 
Where the conditions requisite to relief 
are present, equity will act in spite of a 
contract to avoid the unconscionable result. 
(Citations omitted.) 
In that case, the Court noted that the standards 
governing rescission were identical to that which has been 
adopted in Utah, but held that when the mistake was due to a 
clerical error, such as a misplaced decimal point as in the 
present case, the party making the error was entitled to 
appropriate reliefL 
This court has recognized the equitable standards set 
forth in People, and Simons, supra. In Hottinger v. Jensen, 
684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984), this Court held that refor-
mation is appropriate where the terms of the written instrument 
are mistaken in that they do not show the true intent and 
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understanding of the parties. See also Friedman v. Development 
Management Group, Inc., 82 111. App. 3d 949, 43 N.E.2d 610, 612 
(1980). In Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520 (Utah 1980), the 
Court approved the reformation of a real estate contract and 
explained that if the difference in the two agreements in that 
case was due to fraud or mistake then the agreement could be 
reformed. 
The same principles are also present in the early case 
Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d 571 (1950). In 
Sine, this Court approved the reformation of a deed by the lower 
court and found that the evidence justified the finding of 
mutual mistake of fact. The Court also noted that "any other 
finding would have rendered an absurd result, absurd in the 
sense that the reason for the contract known to both parties 
would have been utterly ignored." 222 P.2d at 584. This Court 
also noted that the clear and convincing standard for refor-
mation does not require that the evidence be undisputed in all 
details. The Court stated: 
The test of clear and convincing is whether, 
taking the evidence as a whole, it prepon-
derates to a convincing degree in favor of 
[the party seeking reformation]. 
Id. 
The lower court found in this case that the intent of 
the parties did not change between the execution of the 
handwritten agreement and the execution of the typewritten 
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agreement. As such, it impliedly held that there had been a 
mutual mistake of fact and that the typewritten agreement did 
not accurately reflect the parties true understanding and that 
there was a clerical error in preparing both documents. 
Lloyd's recognizes that its heavy burden is to 
marshall all of the evidence in support of the trial courtfs 
findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
to support the findings. As previously stated, the findings of 
the trial court are inherently inconsistent and the clear 
weight of all the evidence and record before this Court 
establishes that it was the intent of the parties that com-
missions be paid upon the schedule as alleged in plaintiff's 
Complaint and throughout this proceeding. This is the only 
schedule that is consistent with the $500.00 commission paid by 
Nature's Way to Lloyd's prior to the execution of the typewrit-
ten agreement for the initial three month sales of its product 
to Yurika. Any other finding would render an absurd result 
completely inconsistent with the clear weight of the evidence. 
Point V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
HANDWRITTEN AGREEMENT EXECUTED BY THE 
PARTIES CONTAINED A COMMISSION RATE 
STRUCTURE AT THE RATE OF .350 RATHER THAN 
THE RATE OF 350. 
Lloyd's suggest that a close review of the commission 
rate schedule of Exhibit 2 clearly reveals that there is no 
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decimal point before the 350 and urged that interpretation upon 
the trial court. The trial court, however, found that a deci-
mal point did exist. Lloydfs submits this finding was improper 
and contrary to the document itself. An interpretation that 
the handwritten agreement contains commissions at the rate of 
350, 500 and $1.00 is consistent with the compelling weight of 
the evidence at the trial hereof and adds further support to 
the fact that the typewritten agreement did not accurately 
reflect the parties1 true understanding. 
Point VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO AWARD PLAINTIFF ITS COSTS OF 
DEPOSITIONS AND SERVICE OF SUBPOENA UPON 
NATURE'S WAY'S PRESIDENT FOR HIS DEPOSITION. 
After the lower court ruled on the case, plaintiff 
filed its Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54. (R. 371-373) Included in its claim for 
costs, plaintiff sought the recovery for the service of a sub-
poena upon Burningham, the president of Nature's Way, and for 
the depositions of Burningham and Webb. Nature's Way objected 
to these costs and filed a motion to have the bill of costs 
taxed by the Court. (R. 325-328) On June 11, 1985, the lower 
court ruled on the issue of costs and denied Lloyd's right of 
recovery for the costs of depositions and service of subpoena. 
(R. 649-656) 
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Lloyd's submits that the Court abused its discretion 
in not awarding it these expenses. Under established law, the 
determination of whether to award the expenses of a deposition 
as costs is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Wright, 521 P.2d 563, 567 
(Utah 1974). In making that determination, the courts apply a 
two tier approach. First, whether the deposition was used at 
trial, and secondly whether the deposition was necessary for 
the preparation of the prevailing party's case. The law was 
recently summarized as follows: 
[T]he majority of this Court has con-
sistently held that the costs of depositions 
are taxable "subject to the limitation that 
the trial court is persuaded that they were 
taken in good faith and, in the light of the 
circumstances, appeared to be essential for 
the development and presentation of the 
case." 
Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 683 
P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984), quoting Frarapton v. Wilson, 605 
P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). 
Upon consideration of the factors outlined above, it 
is clear that the costs claimed by the plaintiff are proper. 
The defendant cannot claim that the depositions of its prin-
cipal, Lynn Burninghara, and Douglas Webb were not taken in good 
faith. Likewise, all the depositions were essential for the 
development and presentation of the case. Furthermore, the 
deposition of Mr. Burninghara was used at trial in cross-
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examining Mr. Burningham, and portions were read into the 
record. (Tr. 512) The expenses of the deposition should be 
awarded as costs where the deposition was used by the party 
during the course of the trial. Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 
601, 604 (Utah 1978). 
The deposition of Mr. Webb was taken at a time when 
both parties anticipated that he would be unavailable to 
testify at trial. In view of the circumstances existing at the 
time, the taking of the deposition was necessary for the deve-
lopment and presentation of plaintiff's case. The expenses of 
the deposition therefore come clearly within the rules set 
forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Lawson Supply Co. v. General 
Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 27 Utah 2d 84, 493 P.2d 607, 609 
(1972): 
A test, which has been applied in deter-
mining the propriety of allowing as costs to 
the prevailing party the expense of a depo-
sition taken by him, is whether the deposi-
tion was necessarily obtained in the sense 
that the taking of the deposition and its 
general content were reasonably necessary 
for the development of the case in the light 
of the situation then existing. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the deposi-
tions of both Burningham and Webb were taken in good faith, and 
were necessary to the development and presentation of the case, 
and should therefore be allowed as costs. 
The Court's denial of the service of subpoena on 
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Burningham to insure that he appeared at his deposition is 
equally unsupportable. As cited in the section entitled 
"Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Court," 
defendant was served a summons and complaint in September, 
1983. (R. 5-7) From October through April, 1984, Nature's Way 
failed to file any responsive pleading to the complaint and was 
represented by two separate attorneys in an effort to discuss 
settlement. (R. 53-61) In early November, 1983, Lloyd's 
served upon counsel for Nature's Way, interrogatories and docu-
ments requests in an effort to obtain some sort of accounting 
from Nature's Way to adequately discuss and explore the possi-
bility of settlement. (Id. a'hd 8-16) 
For approximately six months, Lloyd's attempted to 
obtain information from Nature's Way pursuant to the request, 
but no such information was provided. In April, 1984, Lloyd's 
was forced to file a motion to compel discovery and for other 
appropriate sanctions. (R. 17-33) After Lloyd's had set the 
matter for hearing, Nature's Way counsel withdrew. (R. 25-26) 
Plaintiff thereafer obtained an order directing 
Nature's Way to appoint new counsel to represent it at the 
hearing. (R. 27-29) Defendant failed to appear at the hearing 
and the Court ordered that the outstanding discovery be 
completed by it on or before June 1, 1984. (R. 35-37) On the 
very day that the discovery was due, Nature's Way retained pre-
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sent counsel who obtained a two week extension to respond to 
discovery. (R. 38, 45-47) 
Because of Lloyd's past dealings with Nature's Way and 
its president, Burningham, Lloyd's felt compelled to serve 
Burningham with a subpoena duces tecum to insure his presence 
at the deposition and request that he produce certain docu-
ments. Burningham was not an actual party to the proceeding 
and in view of Lloyd's past dealings with him the service of 
the subpoena was necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the 
trial courts, there is insufficient evidence to support the 
trial court's findings and the findings are inconsistent. The 
Court erred in failing to find a mutual mistake had occurred 
and in denying plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint 
seeking reformation of the contract. The trial court erred in 
finding that the handwritten agreement contained a decimal 
before the 350. Finally, the trial court abused its discretion 
in not awarding plaintiff its costs of depositions and service 
of subpoena upon an agent of Nature's Way. 
For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff requests this 
Court to modify the findings to conform to the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence, allow plaintiff to file an amended 
complaint, and enter a judgment against Nature's Way consistent 
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with the commission rate schedule as alleged by plaintiff in 
the amount of $39,710.41 as of February 28, 1985. In the 
alternative, Lloyd's requests the court to vacate the judgment 
and remand the case for a new trial or, at the very least, for 
a trial on the issue of mutual mistake and reformation. In 
view of the fact that until the second day of the trial hereof 
all parties viewed the parties' agreement to be governed by the 
commission rate schedule alleged by plaintiff and plaintiff 
relief upon the representations and stipulations of Nature's 
Way, to that effect a trial with respect to the issue of 
whether a mistake occurred sufficient to justify reformation 
should be held. 
DATED this ) ? day of March, 1986. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
-43-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This will certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant, Appeal from the Judgment of 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Honorable Dean E. Conder were mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following named individual at the address listed below this 
]o day of March, 1986: 
Terry M. Crellin, Esq. 
M. Wayne Western 
THORPE, NORTH & WESTERN 
9662 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
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APPENDIX "A" 
RAY G. MARTINEAU (USB #2105) 
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD (USB #3872) 
1800 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD'S UNLIMITED, a 
corporation, 
Pla|intiff , 
vs . 
NATURE'S WAY MARKETING, LTD., 
a corporation, 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
without a jury before the Honorable Dean E. Conder of the 
above-entitled Court on February 25 and 26, 1985, plaintiff 
being present through its president, Lloyd R. Dowdle, and 
represented by its counsel, Ray G. Martineau and Kevin J. 
Sutterfield, and defendant being present through its president, 
Lynn R. Burningham, and represented by its counsel, Terry M. 
Crellin, and the Court having heard the testimony presented at 
the trial hereof, and having received and reviewed the exhibits 
submitted by the parties, having requested the parties to sub-
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) 
) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) 
) 
) 
) Civil No. C83-6058 
) (Judge Dean E. Conder) 
mit post trial memoranda and having reviewed the same, and 
having previously entered its minute entries dated March 19, 
1985 and April 8, 1985, having heard argument of counsel with 
respect to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on June 11, 1985, and being fully advised in the premises now 
hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. During the spring of 1982, plaintiff's president, 
Lloyd R. Dowdle (ffDowdle!f) and defendant's president, Lynn 
Burningham ("Burningham") entered into an oral understanding in 
which defendant agreed to pay plaintiff commissions on all 
sales made by defendant to Yurika Foods Corporation ("Yurika") 
in consideration of plaintiff's efforts in acquiring Yurika to 
market a coffee extender product handled by defendant. 
2. On or about April 24, 1982, defendant entered into 
an agreement with Yurika whereby Yurika became the exclusive 
sales and marketing representative for defendant for the coffee 
extender product. 
3. On or about August 11, 1982, after previous oral 
negotiations between Dowdle and Burningham, a hand written 
agreement prepared by Dowdle was presented to Burningham. A 
discussion followed wherein the parties modified the handwrit-
ten agreement, and the modified handwritten agreement was then 
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signed by both parties. 
4. The handwritten agreement actually executed by 
Dowdle and Burningham on August 11, 1982, contained the 
following provisions with respect to the commission schedule: 
1 Unit - 60 packets pack: .25^ 
1 Unit - 2 lb. bulk pack: .35^ 
1 Unit - 5 lb. bulk pack: 50£ 
1 Unit - 37 lb. bulk pack: $1.00 
5. Dowdle thereafter caused the executed hand written 
agreement to be typed by his secretary and the commission sche-
dule contained in Paragraph 1 thereof was typed as follows: 
1 Unit - 60 packet pack: .25$^  
1 Unit - 2 lb. bulk pack: .35^ 
1 Unit - 5 lb. bulk pack: . 50£ 
1 Unit - 37 lb. bulk pack: $1.00 
The typewritten agreement was executed by the parties on August 
16, 1982. 
6. The intent of the parties with respect to the com-
missions to be paid by defendant to plaintiff did not change 
between August 11, 1982, the date of the execution of the hand 
written agreement and August 16, 1982, the date of execution of 
the typewritten agreement. 
7. Paragraph 5 of the typewritten agreement contains 
an integration clause which states that the "Agreement con-
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tains the entire understanding of the parties hereto and may 
not be altered, amended, modified, or discharged in any way 
whatsoever except by subsequent agreement in writing by all the 
parties hereto.tf The Agreement was to be effective between the 
parties as of August 1, 1982. 
8. On August 16, 1982, defendant paid to plaintiff 
the amount of $500.00 as and for commissions due plaintiff for 
previous sales made of the coffee saver product to Yurika by 
defendant from April 24, 1982 through August 1, 1982. This 
payment was made without a formal accounting being made as to 
the actual number of sales of the subject product from defen-
dant to Yurika. 
9. The number of units of the coffee saver product 
expressly covered by the agreement of the parties which were 
sold to Yurika by defendant between August 1, 1982 and February 
23, 1984 ("Subject Period") was stipulated by the plaintiff and 
defendant as follows: 
60 packets pack: 77,348 units 
2 lb. pack: 16,217 units 
5 lb. bulk pack: 4,564 units 
37 lb. bulk pack: 0 units 
10. At the time the handwritten and typewritten 
agreements were executed, the parties assumed that all of the 
coffee saver product sold by defendant to Yurika would be 
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marketed in units consisting of 60 packets packs, 2 lb. bulk 
packs, 5 lb. bulk packs and 37 lb. bulk packs. The reasonable 
intent and expectation of the parties was that in the event the 
coffee saver product was sold to Yurika and marketed by it in 
any other size of units, plaintiff would receive a commission 
from defendant on the basis of their size and weight compared 
to the rates of their agreement. 
11. Supplemental sales of coffee saver product were 
made to Yurika by defendant during the Subject Period in 30 lb. 
bulk pack units and 30 packets pack units. The supplemental 
sales were closely related to the units of product recited in 
the typewritten agreement. Specifically, a 30 packets pack 
unit is exactly one-half of a 60 packets pack unit and the 30 
lb. bulk pack unit is almost equal to the 37 lb. bulk pack 
unit. 
12. The number of units of supplemental sales were 
stipulated by the plaintiff and defendant to be as follows: 
30 packets pack: 51,444 units 
30 lb. bulk pack: 18 units 
13. Defendant received in excess of $625,000.00 from 
Yurika for sales of the coffee extender product to Yurika 
during the Subject Period. 
14. Dowdle agreed orally with Burningham to pay 
Burningham one-half of anything Dowdle would receive from 
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Yurika in the way of a finder's fee for putting Yurika in con-
tact with Burningham. 
15. There is insufficient evidence to indicate that 
Dowdle received an actual finder's fee, and as to any value any 
such finder's fee may have. 
16. Defendant failed to pay to plaintiff any com-
missions or provide any accounting to plaintiff pursuant to the 
terms of their agreement prior to the time that the above-
entitled action was filed. 
17. The agreement contained no provision for the 
award of attorney's fees in favor of the prevailing party. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact now 
makes and enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The typewritten agreement is a valid, integrated 
and enforceable contract binding on both parties and defendant 
is liable for commissions in accordance with the explicit terms 
of the typewritten agreement. 
2. The size and weight of supplemental sales of the 
coffee extender product made by defendant to Yurika bear a 
nexus to the product size and weights set forth in the 
typewritten agreement and defendant should be liable for com-
missions on (1) all sales of 30 packets pack units in an amount 
of one-half the commission on 60 packets pack units and (2) 
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all sales of 30 lb. pack units in an amount of the commission 
on a 37 lb. bulk pack. 
3. Plaintiff shouLd be awarded judgment against 
defendant for commissions due plaintiff pursuant to the express 
terms of the typewritten agreement from the period between 
August 1, 1982 and February 23, 1984 in an amount of $272.48 
together with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per 
annum thereon in an amount of $49.16, for a total of $321.64, 
and plaintiff should be awarded judgment against defendant for 
commissions due for the supplemental sales made by defendant to 
Yurika during the Subject Period in an amount of $80.31 
together with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per 
annum thereon in an amount of $12.30, for a total of $94.61, 
making a present total judgment of $416.25, together with 
interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum 
from the date hereof until paid. 
4. Plaintiff should be further awarded court costs 
against defendant but no attorney's fees. 
5. Defendant should take nothing on its counterclaim. 
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MADE AND ENTERED this / 0 day of June, 1985 
BY THE COURT: 
\ 
J.-^ <-/ 
Judge*Dean E. Conder 
Certificate of Service 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following on 
this
 \3^ daY of June, 1985: 
Terry M. Crellin 
M. Wayne Western 
THORPE, NORTH & WESTERN 
9662 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
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APPENDIX "B" 
Terry M. Crellin (USB #0755) 
M. Wayne Western (USB #3433) 
THORPE, NORTH & WESTERN 
9662 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84 070 
Telephone: 566-6633 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD'S UNLIMITED, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NATURE'S WAY MARKETING, 
a corporation, 
Defendant. 
LTD., 
> LIST OF WITNESSES 
1 AND EXHIBITS WHICH 
• DEFENDANT MAY USE 
> Civil No. C83-6058 
i (Judge Dean E. Conder) 
In accordance with the instructions of the* Court, the 
following List of Witnesses and Exhibits is being provided, 
WITNESSES 
1. Lynn Burningham 
RPE. N0ftTH 
WESTERN 
JTW STATE STREET 
Y. UTAH 64070 
)1) 566-6633 
2. Todd Burningham 
Jack Patterson 
will testify about negotiations 
with Yurika and negotiations with 
plaintiff including consideration 
for the agreement. Mr. Lynn 
Burningham will also testify as t 
the subject matter of the 
Counterlaim. 
will testify about negotiations 
with plaintiff including 
consideration given for the 
agreement. Mr. Todd Burningham 
will also testify as to the 
subject matter of the 
Counterclaim. 
will testify as to attending 
meetings held by plaintiff and th< 
occurrences at those meetings. 
THORPE. NORTH 
& WESTERN 
.. " i . . - r * * t S'R£ET 
4. Max Hymas 
Ronald Cutler 
6. Marian Webb 
7. Lloyd R. Dcwdle 
will testify as to the 
circumstances and expectations of 
defendant concerning the 
negotiations and agreement betwee 
plaintiff and defendant. 
will testify as an expert 
concerning the amount of material 
shipped and delivered to Yurika 
and the amount of income plaintii 
derived form the executive 
distributorship which was receive 
from Yurika. 
will testify about her son's and 
Mr. Dawdle's association and the: 
mutual association with Yurika ar 
Universe Foods. 
will be asked questions concernir 
the entire subject matter of the 
suit, including the Counterclaim 
EXHIBITS 
1. Hand written page showing Dowdle's expenses with 
respect to Yurika activities. 
2. Distributor Application of Dowdle for Yurika. 
3. Distributor Application of Dowdle for Universe Food 
4. Yurika Foods Corp. Bonus Recap and Monthly 
Transaction Reports for months of April 1982 through October 
1984. 
5. Product Purchase Orders for orders by plaintiff fro 
Yurika. 
6. Article excerpt from May 1982 issue of Utah Holiday 
Magazine. 
6a. Sales Manual Rules & Regulations Brochure of Yurika 
7. Agreement between plaintiff and defendant dated 
August 6, 1982. 
8. Check No. 720 from defendnt to plaintiff. 
9. Nondisclosure Statement between defendant and Yuri-
10. Stargazer — November 1983 ,!Bn. 
11. Stargazer -- December 1983. 
12. Agreement between defendant and Yurika dated April 
24, 1982. 
The exhibits listed as Nos. 1-7 and 10 and 11 were 
obtained from plaintiff, and there is no need to provide copi 
to plaintiff. A copy of Exhibit No. 8 is being provided 
plaintiff herewith. Copies of Exhibit Nos. 9 and 12 have 
previously been provided to plaintiff. 
Dated this 25th day of January 1985. 
^ / . 
Terry M£/Crellin 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing LIST 
OF WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS WHICH DEFENDANT MAY USE was hand 
delivered to the law offices of Ray G. Martineau, 1800 
Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 on this 25th day of January, 1985. 
RPE, NORTH 
WESTERN 
(TH S'ATE STREET 
Y, UTAH &4070 
)1) 566-6633 
^C 
APPENDIX "C 
KEVIN J. SUTTSRFIELD (USB #38/2) 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (USB #3752) 
LAW OFFICES OF RAY G. MARTINEAU, P.C. 
1800 3enefieial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD'S UNLIMITED, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NATURE'S WAY MARKETING, LTD., 
a corporation, 
Defendant, 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF 
PROCEEDINGS OF UNREPORTED 
HEARING 
0 P 
Civil No. C83-6058 
(Judge Dean E. Conder) 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 11(g), Plaintiff submits 
the following statement as to the proceedings of the hearing 
held before the above-entitled Court on January 22, 1985. The 
grounds for the statement is that no transcript of the pro-
ceedings was made by the Court Reporter. 
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. At the hearing on January 22, 1985, the Court con-
sidered two matters, plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on file herein dated January 4, 1985, and a Pre-trial 
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Settlement Conference pursuant to Court Order dated November 
26, 1984 on file herein. 
2. At the hearing, defendant, through its counsel, 
stipulated that there was no issue with respect to the amounts, 
if any, due and owing by it to plaintiff as sought in 
Plaintifffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on file herein 
dated January 4, 1985, pursuant to that certain Agreement bet-
ween plaintiff and defendant dated August 16, 1982. 
Defendant's only opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment was that defendant claimed" t*he Agreement was 
unenforceable because there was no indication in the Agreement 
that any actual consideration for the contract was given by 
plaintiff. There was no dispute at the hearing as to the 
amounts prayed for by plaintiff or as to the commissions to be 
paid by defendant for sales defendant made to a third party. 
The fact that defendant did not object to the amounts prayed 
for by plaintiff in the event that the Agreement was enfor-
ceable is evident from Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated January 
16, 1985, and its Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated January 
23, 1985, both on file herein. Plaintiff's counsel, who 
attended the hearing, also has a specific recollection that 
defendant, through its counsel, admitted that there was no 
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dispute as to the amounts owing under the Agreement, if the 
Agreement was found to be enforceable. 
3. At the hearing, the Court also instructed counsel 
for each party to furnish to opposing counsel on or before 
January 25, 1985, a list of witnesses and exhibits to be relied 
upon in the trial of this matter. The Court also ruled that 
all objections to said witnesses and exhibits should be filed 
and served on opposing counsel on or before January 28, 1985. 
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the amounts prayed for in 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment shall be deemed 
accurate unless defendant advises plaintiff prior to the trial 
hereof of any facts, documents, or information upon which 
defendant intended to rely with respect to any offsets or 
adjustments in said amount as prayed for by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's counsel has a specific recollection of this ruling 
and the ruling is set forth in that certain Order Governing 
Discovery on file herein mailed to opposing counsel on January 
29, 1985. No objection to the Order Governing Discovery was 
filed by defendant and the fact that the parties relied upon 
the Court's ruling is also indicated by the List of Witnesses 
and Exhibits submitted by plaintiff and the List of Witnesses 
and Exhibits Which Defendant May Use dated January 25, 1985 on 
file herein. 
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DATED this 15 day of March, 1986, 
/ ]iiW\As<mit^. ^ > 
KEVIN J^ "SUTTERFuELD " 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This will certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Plaintiff's Statement of Proceedings of Unreported 
Hearing was served upon the following, by mailing a copy 
thereof, postage prepaid, to the address listed below this 
i ^ a v of March, 1986: 
Terry M. Crellin, Esq. 
M. Wayne Western 
THORPE, NORTH & WESTERN 
9662 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
y^fac^w lA-&* 
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APPENDIX MD 
RAY G. MARTINEAU (USB #2105) 
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD (USB #3872) 
1800 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD'S UNLIMITED, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NATURE'S WAY MARKETING, LTD., 
a corporation, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C83-6058 
(Judge Dean E. Conder) 
Plaintiff complains of defendant and for causes of 
action alleges: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized, 
validly existing and in good standing under and by virtue of 
the laws of the State of Utah and has its principal place of 
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant is a corporation duly organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Utah and has its prin-
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cipal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. The venue of this action is properly laid in 
the above-entitled Court, pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 78-13-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended and 
supplemented• 
COUNT I 
(Contract Reformation) 
4. The allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 
3 above are by this reference incorporated into and made a part 
of this Count I. 
5. On or prior1to August 1, 1982 plaintiff and defen-
dant entered into a certain agreement (,fAgreement11) for the 
distribution, sales and marketing of a certain coffee extender 
product to be marketed under the names "Spring Water Mineral 
Brew11 and "Golden Cup Coffee Saver" ("Spring Water/Golden 
Cup"). 
6. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement defendant 
agreed and became obligated to pay to plaintiff a monthly com-
mission, due and payable each month on or before twenty days 
following the end of the month, to which such payment related, 
on the net sales of Spring Water/Golden Cup computed on the 
following basis: 
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Commission Due Lloyd's 
Quantity Sold Unlimited per Unit 
1 unit - 60 packets pack $ .25 
1 unit - 21b. bulk pack .35 
1 unit - 51b. bulk pack .50 
1 unit - 371b. bulk pack 1.00 
7. The Agreement between plaintiff and defendant was 
reduced to a handwritten instrument on or about August 11, 
1982 and to a subsequent typewritten Agreement dated on or 
about August 16, 1982 wherein the commissions due Lloyd's 
Unlimited per unit as agreed to by the parties was ambiguously 
or inaccurately reflected therein. Copies of said handwritten 
and typewritten instruments are attached hereto marked Exhibits 
"A" and ffB" and by reference made a part hereof. 
8. At the time the typewritten Agreement was exe-
cuted by the parties, plaintiff and defendant had agreed and 
fully intended that Paragraph 1(a) thereof would read as 
follows: 
1 unit - 60 packets pack $ .25 
1 unit - 2 lb. bulk pack .35 
1 unit - 5 lb. bulk pack .50 
1 unit - 37 lb. bulk pack 1.00 
9. By reason of said ambiguity or scrivener error, 
plaintiff is entitled to have the Agreement between the parties 
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reformed by the Court to accurately reflect the parties1 
agreement, intent and understanding as stated above. 
COUNT II 
(Claims for Commissions Owing) 
10. The allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 
9 above are by this reference incorporated into and made a part 
of this Count II. 
11. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement defendant 
agreed and became obligated to pay to plaintiff a monthly com-
mission, due and payable each month on or before twenty days 
following the end of the month to which such payment related, 
on the net sales of Spring Water/Golden Cup computed on the 
following basis: 
Commission Due Lloyd's 
Quantity Sold Unlimited per Unit 
1 unit - 60 packets pack $ .25 
1 unit - 2 lb. bulk pack .35 
1 unit - 5 lb. bulk pack .50 
1 unit - 37 lb. bulk pack 1.00 
12. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement defendant 
agreed and became obligated to deliver to plaintiff an 
accounting for all Spring Water/Golden Cup sales, which 
accounting was to accompany any commission payment due plain-
tiff as above stated. 
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13. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement defendant 
agreed and became obligated to make available for plaintiff's 
inspection and/or copying, at all reasonable times, any and all 
accounting records and all documents pertaining to defendant's 
sales of Spring Water/Golden Cup. 
14. Plaintiff has made repeated demands upon defen-
dant for payment of commissions due plaintiff on defendant's 
distribution of Spring Water/Golden Cup products, but despite 
said demands defendant has wholly failed, neglected and refused 
to pay the same or any part thereof, and said commissions for 
the period commencing August 1, 1982, through the date hereof 
are still due and owing to plaintiff, together with interest 
thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from the date when the 
same became due until paid. 
15. Plaintiff has made repeated demands upon defen-
dant for an accounting of sales that have been made and of com-
missions due, copies of defendant's monthly accounting records 
relating to the same and any and all other related documents 
indicating the distribution of Spring Water/Golden Cup for the 
period commencing August 1, 1982 through the date hereof, but 
despite said demands defendant has wholly failed, neglected and 
refused to deliver any accounting or related documents to plain-
tiff or to make any of such documents available for plaintiff's 
inspection and copying, except pursuant to discovery herein. 
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WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment as follows: 
1. Under Count I hereof for an Order of this Court 
reforming the typewritten executed Agreement to accurately 
reflect the parties1 agreement, intent and understanding. 
2. Under Count II hereof, for an Order requiring 
defendant to provide plaintiff with a proper accounting of 
defendant's sales and distribution of Spring Water/Golden Cup 
for the period commencing August 1, 1982 through the date 
hereof. 
3. Under Count II hereof for a judgment in favor of 
plaintiff and against defendant for any and all sums found to 
be due and owing by defendant to plaintiff under and in connec-
tion with said Agreement, together with damages resulting from 
the breach by defendant of said Agreement. 
4. For plaintiff's costs incurred herein. 
5. For such other and further relief as may appear 
just and equitable in the premises. 
RAY G. MART1NEAU 
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Certificate of Service 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Amended Complaint to the following on this day of March, 
1985: 
Terry M. Crellin 
M. Wayne Western 
THORPE, NORTH & WESTERN 
9662 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
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APPENDIX "E" 
Rule 2 RULES OF PRACTICE—3RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT Rule 
Rule 2. Law and Motion Calendar. 
Rules 2.7 and 2.8 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circi 
Courts of the State of Utah shall not apply to motions filed in the Third Judic 
District Court. 
(a) All law and motion mat ters will be heard by the judge assigned 
the case. These mat ters will be set on a regular law and motion calend 
as arranged with the clerk of the judge assigned to the case. Ex pai 
mat ters based upon stipulation will be presented only to the jud 
assigned to the case. 
(b) Counsel shall contact the court and receive a date for hearing on t] 
regular law and motion calendar, or may file a wri t ten request tha t tl 
mat te r be resolved without hearing based upon the briefs submitted. 
(c) Orders to show cause and other matters requiring writ ten notice wi 
be heard only after writ ten notice, which shall be served not less than fn 
(5) days prior to the date specified in the notice for hearing, unless tl 
court for good cause shown shall by order shorten the t ime for notice 
hearing. 
(d) Motions based upon depositions or supported thereby shall not t 
heard unless the depositions are filed in the clerk's office at leai 
forty-eight (48) hours before the hearing on the said motion. 
(e) Affidavits not filed within the time required by the Utah Rules < 
Civil Procedure shall not be received, except on stipulation of the partie 
or for good cause shown. 
(f) All motions except uncontested or ex parte mat ters may b 
accompanied by a brief s ta tement of points and authorit ies, and any affidE 
vits relied upon in support thereof. Points and authorit ies supporting o 
opposing a motion shall not exceed five (5) pages in length, exclusive of th 
s ta tement of material facts as hereinafter provided, except as waived b; 
order of the court on ex parte application. 
(g) The points and authorit ies in support of a dispositive motion shal 
begin with a section tha t contains a concise s ta tement of material facts a 
to which the movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall b< 
stated in separate numbered sentences, and shall refer with particularity 
to those portions of the record upon which the movant relies. 
(h) The points and authorit ies in opposition to a dispositive motion shal 
begin with a section tha t contains a concise s ta tement of material facts as 
to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each fact in dispute 
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences, and shall refer with par-
t iculari ty to those portions of the record upon which the opposing part} 
relies and, if applicable, shall s tate the numbered sentence or sentences oi 
the movant 's facts tha t are disputed. All material facts set forth in the 
s ta tement of the movant shall be deemed admitted for the purpose oi 
summary judgment, unless specifically controverted by the s tatement oi 
the opposing party. 
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3 RULES OF PRACTICE—3RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT Rule 3 
(i) If a memorandum of points and authorities is filed in support of a 
notion it must be served on the opposing party or his counsel and filed 
with the court no later than ten (10) days before the date set for hearing, 
[fa reply memorandum is filed it shall be served upon the opposing party 
Dr counsel no later t han five (5) days before the date of hearing. 
(j) A courtesy copy of all affidavits and memoranda of points and 
authorities filed by counsel shall be served upon the judge hearing the 
matter at least forty-eight (48) hours before the date set for hearing, and 
shall indicate the date upon which the mat ter is set for hearing. Such copy 
shall be clearly marked as a courtesy copy, and shall not be filed with the 
clerk of the court. 
(k) The court in civil mat ters on its motion or at a party's request may 
direct argument of any motion by telephone conference without court 
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all such telephone argu-
ments and the rulings thereon if requested by any counsel. 
le 3. Limitation on Discovery and Motions* 
) The parties conducting discovery under Rules 33, 34 and 36 of the Utah 
»s of Civil Procedure shall not file Interrogatories or Requests with the 
t, but shall file only a certificate of service stat ing that such 
rrogatories or Requests have been served on the other parties and the date 
ich service. 
re party serving the Interrogatories or Requests shall retain the original 
eof with the original proof of service affixed to it. The party responding to 
Interrogatories or Requests shall serve original responses made under oath 
:h shall be retained by the party serving the Interrogatories or Requests, 
written Interrogatories or Requests and any responses thereto shall not be 
[ unless the court on motion and notice and for good cause shown so orders. 
) Any party filing a Motion to Compel compliance with any discovery shall 
ch a copy of the Interrogatories, Requests or Answers at issue in such 
ion. 
) All parties shall be entitled as a mat ter of right to conduct discovery 
:eedings in accordance with this rule. All discovery proceedings shall be 
pleted and all depositions and other documents filed with the court no later 
i thir ty (30) days before the date set for trial of the case. The right to 
luct discovery proceedings within thirty (30) days before trial shall be 
lin the discretion of the court. Motions to conduct discovery within thirty 
days before trial shall be presented to the judge assigned to the case upon 
ce to the other parties in the action. In exercising its discretion the court 
11 take into consideration the necessity and reasons for such discovery, the 
^ence or lack of diligence of the parties seeking such discovery, whether the 
n i t t ing of such discovery will prevent the case from going to trial on the 
2 set, or result in prejudice to any party. Nothing herein shall preclude or 
it voluntary exchange of information or discovery by stipulation of the 
ties at any time prior to the date set for trial, but in no event shall such 
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